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Abstract
The prospect of quantum computing threatens the security of modern encryption
methods, putting our private communications at risk. With experts predicting the
development of powerful quantum computers as early as the end of the decade, the
urgency of transitioning to ‘quantum-safe’ communications is apparent. There are
two classes of solutions available: post-quantum cryptography (PQC), which refers
to communication algorithms designed to be safe against quantum computers, and
quantum key distribution (QKD), a new technology with unique advantages and
challenges. These solutions are not mutually exclusive, and this review argues that
they are in fact complementary solutions to the threat of quantum computing. However,
QKD has received criticism for being a less practical solution than PQC. This review
makes the case for QKD and argues that it offers significant advantages which are not
adequately recognised. I conclude that the development of QKD would benefit from
increased government support and I provide policy recommendations for how to best
support it.
Introduction
Quantum computing is a new technology which
promises to perform certain computations much
faster than any modern supercomputer. Accel-
erated drug discovery and better climate models
are just two examples of applications which will
benefit from the capabilities of quantum comput-
ers. On the flip side, quantum computers will
also be able to break most methods of encryption
used today, putting our private communications
at risk.
Since the first theoretical developments in the
1980s, quantum computers have quickly become
a reality. Major investments from government re-
search budgets and private companies have led to
the development of the first iteration of quantum
computers, comparable perhaps to the first (clas-
sical) computers built nearly 70 years ago using
vacuum tubes. This rapid progress is cause for
alarm since when a sufficiently powerful quantum
computer is developed, our standard encryption
methods will become inadequate and our com-
munications insecure. Moreover, not only are
our future communications under threat, our cur-
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rent communications are too: modern encryption
methods rely on what is known as ‘public-key’
cryptography. The word ‘public’ points to the
fact that information encrypted in this way can
be recorded and stored by anyone. This opens
the possibility for an eavesdropper to record our
private, encrypted communications and wait for
a sufficiently powerful quantum computer to be-
come available and use it to decrypt them in the
future. Since we require certain communications
to remain private for long periods of time, we
must make the transition to quantum-safe forms
of communications well in advance of the devel-
opment of quantum computers. This is especially
true since transitioning to ‘quantum-safe’ forms
of communications could take many years.
Fortunately, alongside the development of quan-
tum computers, there has been ongoing research
into alternative, quantum-safe communication
methods. Broadly speaking, two distinct classes
of solutions are available, known as post-quantum
cryptography (PQC) and quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD). This review gives an overview of both
technologies but will focus on the advantages and
challenges presented by QKD. I argue that QKD,
being a truly novel technology, is poorly under-
stood and in need of a defence. It has significant
advantages which are not adequately recognised
and there has been tremendous progress in ad-
dressing the practical challenges of making it a
useful and cost-effective solution. The review
is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces
public-key cryptography and why quantum com-
puting poses a threat to private communications;
Section 3 introduces PQC and QKD as poten-
tial solutions to this threat; Section 4 makes the
case for QKD and finally Section 5 discusses the
outlook of both technologies and provides policy
recommendations.
Cryptography and Quantum
Computers
Cryptography has been used for centuries. An
early example is the so-called Caesar cipher used,
as the name suggests, by the ancient Romans.
The Caesar cipher works as follows: two people
who want to communicate, conventionally called
Alice and Bob, privately agree on a secret number,
which we call the ‘key’. To encrypt a message,
Alice replaces each letter with another letter a
fixed number of positions down the alphabet, de-
termined by the value of the key. To decrypt
the message, Bob simply reverses the process,
replacing each letter by that found the same num-
ber of positions up the alphabet. While modern
cryptography has advanced a great amount, it
is still based on the same principle: two com-
municating parties agree on a secret number, or
key, which they use to encrypt and decrypt their
communications. This type of cryptography is
known as ‘symmetric-key’ cryptography because
the same key is used for encrypting and decrypt-
ing messages. The problem with symmetric-key
cryptography is that Alice and Bob need to agree
on a secret key before communicating. This re-
quires them to either meet in person or use a
trusted courier, neither of which are practical
solutions for securing the vast amount of infor-
mation that is nowadays sent over the internet.
The solution to this problem, only developed in
the 1970s, is known as ‘public-key’ cryptography.
In public-key cryptography, the keys that are
used to encrypt and decrypt the communications
are different, but mathematically related. The
key which is used to encrypt messages is made
public, while the key used to decrypt messages
is kept private. In this way Bob can send Al-
ice his public key, which can be seen by anyone,
for her to encrypt her messages with. She can
then send her encrypted message to Bob and, cru-
cially, only he will be able to decrypt it, since only
he has the corresponding private key. Since the
keys are mathematically related, it is important
that no eavesdropper is able to figure out the pri-
vate key given the public key. The mathematical
problem for doing this needs to be ‘intractable’,
that is, very difficult and time-consuming. For
example, the mathematical problem that guar-
antees the security of the widely used public-key
RSA protocol is factoring: the process of finding
the prime factors of a large number. It would
take modern computers thousands of years to
factor the public keys used in RSA encryption,
which is why the communications are considered
secure. If an eavesdropper was able to quickly
factor large numbers, then they would be able to
break RSA encryption since they could extract
the private key from the public one. Although
there are good reasons to think that factoring
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really is an intractable problem, there remains
the possibility that a mathematical or technolog-
ical breakthrough will allow us to quickly factor
large numbers. Indeed, in 1994, the physicist
Peter Shor showed that quantum computers will
be able to quickly factor large numbers and de-
code other mathematical encryptions currently
used in public-key cryptography. A white paper
published by the European Telecommunications
Standards Institute (ETSI) states that
[m]ost of the public-key cryptog-
raphy that is used on the Inter-
net today is based on algorithms
that are vulnerable to [attacks by
a quantum computer]. These in-
clude public-key algorithms such
as RSA, ECC, Diffie-Hellman
and DSA [1].
This means that, in a future with sufficiently
advanced quantum computers, currently used
public-key cryptography is at risk. And not only
are our future communications at risk: quantum
computers threaten our current communications
too. Public keys, by definition, can be recorded
and stored by anyone, along with the encrypted
messages. In this way an eavesdropper could
record encrypted private communications and cor-
responding public keys and wait for a sufficiently
powerful quantum computer to become available.
They could then use the quantum computer to
solve the mathematical encoding problem, obtain
the private key, and decrypt the communications.
This is known as ‘retrospective decryption’ and all
public-key cryptography protocols are susceptible
to this attack [2].
So how long will it take for sufficiently power-
ful quantum computers to become available? A
leader in the quantum computing race, Google
CEO Sundar Pichai, speaking at the 2020 World
Economic Forum in Davos, claimed that
In a five to ten year time frame,
quantum computing will break
encryption as we know it today
[3].
This is arguably an overly optimistic outlook from
a tech-company executive, but predictions coming
from academia are also sobering. Michele Mosca,
Physics professor at the Institute for Quantum
Computing (IQC) at the University of Waterloo,
predicts a 50% chance of quantum computers
breaking RSA encryption by 2032 [4]. His col-
league Matteo Mariantoni, also professor at IQC,
believes that a quantum computer capable of
breaking RSA encryption could be built by 2030
[5]. In many cases, private information needs
to be kept secret for several years. For exam-
ple, census data in the UK is required to remain
undisclosed for 100 years [6] and it is easy to
understand why health records, government com-
munications, and other sensitive data have similar
secrecy lifespans. If predictions about the devel-
opment of quantum computers are correct, then
these types of data are already at risk of being
hacked by a future quantum computer. To make
matters more urgent, transitioning to quantum-
safe forms of communication could require several
years, so it is apparent that we must start this
transition now.
Two Solutions
Fortunately, scientific research has not focused
solely on building quantum computers, but also
on developing quantum-safe communications,
such as PQC and QKD.
We saw that the security of public-key cryptog-
raphy is based on the intractability of certain
mathematical problems. For the most widely
used public-key protocols, quantum computers
could quickly solve these intractable problems,
rendering the communications insecure. However,
the possibility exists that other mathematical
problems will remain intractable, even to quan-
tum computers. This is what motivates research
into PQC. PQC refers to cryptographic proto-
cols which are thought to be secure even against
quantum computers. In this way, the threat of
quantum computing is averted by exchanging the
cryptographic protocols we use with ones that
are based on mathematical problems which are
intractable even to quantum computers.
PQC is a very appealing solution since it is based
on the same principles as the cryptographic meth-
ods we use today. Transitioning to quantum-safe
communications using PQC could involve little
more than a software update to our computers.
And there are already many proposed PQC proto-
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cols; currently there is active research into testing
and validating these new protocols. The National
Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) in
the USA is currently hosting a competition [7] to
identify the most promising PQC protocols with
the intention of establishing new standards for
quantum-safe communications. After reducing
the initial pool of 69 candidate protocols down
to 26, they have now entered the second phase of
this process, during which the remaining candi-
dates will be further examined with the aim of
drafting the final standards for PQC in 2022.
The downside is that public-key PQC protocols
are still vulnerable to retrospective decryption
and future advances in mathematics or technology
that might render them insecure. The possibility
remains that mathematical problems that we once
thought intractable, even for quantum computers,
turn out not to be.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a fundamen-
tally different approach to quantum-safe com-
munications, based on the principles of physics
rather than on the use of intractable mathemati-
cal problems. QKD solves the same problem as
public-key cryptography: it allows two parties
(Alice and Bob) to establish a secret key between
them. The key can then be used with symmetric-
key cryptography to communicate securely. In
QKD, Alice and Bob communicate using single
particles of light, called photons. Photons obey
the laws of quantum mechanics, which is the
physical theory that describes the behaviour of
very small objects, like single atoms, or photons.
When we use single photons to carry information,
we call that information quantum information,
which has different properties to classical infor-
mation. Quantum information has two unique
properties that make QKD secure:
1. It is impossible to make exact copies of
quantum information.
2. It is impossible to measure or observe
quantum information without introduc-
ing a disturbance and changing it in some
detectable way.
In this way, if Alice sends Bob a secret key using
quantum information carried by photons, she can
be sure that: 1. no eavesdropper is able to copy
and store that information and 2. if an eavesdrop-
per tried to measure or observe the secret key,
they would inevitably introduce a disturbance in
the key, which Alice and Bob could detect. Cru-
cially, quantum mechanics and these two prop-
erties of quantum information are fundamental
theories in physics. This makes QKD resilient to
any future advances in mathematics or technology
since, unlike public-key cryptography, it does not
make any assumptions about the intractability
of certain mathematical problems, or about the
technology available to potential eavesdroppers.
In practice, QKD consists of using hardware like
lasers and specialised electronics to send single
photons through optical fibres between Alice and
Bob. Making the transition from our current en-
cryption methods to QKD would therefore require
much more than a software update.
Clearly there are pros and cons to each solution.
PQC offers quantum-safe communications based
on the same cryptographic principles used to-
day. QKD provides unique advantages at the
cost of requiring large changes in infrastructure
and hardware.
The Advantages and Chal-
lenges of QKD
The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) in
the UK released a white paper on QKD in 2016
‘[making] the case for research into developing
post-quantum cryptography as a more practical
and cost-effective step [than QKD] towards de-
fending real-world communication systems from
the threat of a future quantum computer’ [8].
They followed this up with a report in 2020 re-
iterating that they ‘[do] not endorse the use of
QKD for any government or military applications’
citing the ‘specialised hardware requirements of
QKD’ as a reason [9]. In light of this criticism,
and the fact that QKD is a truly novel technology,
I argue that the advantages of QKD are poorly
understood and the practical challenges are over-
stated. In what follows, I will outline the unique
advantages offered by QKD, as compared to PQC,
and then address the main issues regarding the
practicality of this technology.
First, QKD offers future-proof communications.
This does not mean that a QKD system will
never be hacked, but rather that communications
secured via QKD cannot be hacked after the com-
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munication has happened: either the hacking
happens in real-time or it does not happen at
all. With QKD, cryptographic keys are never
made public and, as described in the previous
section, QKD keys are impossible to copy and
store. This is an important advantage over our
current, and any future, public-key cryptography
methods, including those based on PQC. With
public-key cryptography there is always the pos-
sibility that encrypted messages and public keys
are stored by an eavesdropper and decrypted at
a future date when, through advances in technol-
ogy or mathematics, the communication protocols
become insecure. QKD is the only known solu-
tion to this retrospective decryption. QKD is
therefore particularly suited to securing commu-
nications with long secrecy lifespans that must
remain undisclosed for many years. Promising
use cases for QKD include the storage of financial
and customer data by large institutions, the han-
dling of private health records, including human
genome data, and the protection of government
and military communications [10].
Second, theoretical QKD protocols have been
proven to be perfectly secure, while no such proof
is available for PQC. PQC relies on assumptions
about the intractability of certain mathematical
problems. But we have seen how developments
in technology like quantum computing can un-
dermine these assumptions. With QKD we do
not need to rely on such assumptions, and we say
that QKD is ‘unconditionally secure’. This is not
to say that QKD systems are perfectly secure,
just that the underlying theory is. It is then still
important to make sure that the physical systems
that implement the theoretical QKD protocols do
not inadvertently introduce any vulnerabilities,
which might be exploited by an eavesdropper1.
The study of these ‘implementation security’ vul-
nerabilities is an active area of research that is
bringing QKD systems closer to achieve an ideal
of perfect security.
Lastly, I argue that investing into the develop-
ment of QKD promises benefits that go well be-
yond just securing our private communications.
In the long run, we can envision a ‘quantum inter-
net’, which is a network of quantum computers
connected via QKD links. While the details are
outside the scope of this review, the quantum
internet has applications not just for secure com-
munications but also for ‘secure access to remote
quantum computers, more accurate clock syn-
chronisation and scientific applications such as
combining light from distant telescopes to im-
prove observations.’ [11]. A QKD infrastructure
will serve as the foundation for such a quantum
internet.
The main arguments against QKD revolve around
practicality. QKD is based on hardware, like
lasers used to send photons through optical fi-
bres, while PQC is based on software, algorithms
much like the ones we currently use, which could
run on our computers without modification. Ob-
viously, as suggested by NCSC, PQC is the more
‘practical and cost-effective solution’. However,
there has been tremendous progress in the past 20
years towards addressing the practical challenges
that come with implementing QKD in the real
world. Here, I will address potential concerns and
give a sense for how far the technology has come.
A central challenge in implementing QKD over
long distances and at high communications rates
is the ‘transmission loss’ in optical fibres: approx-
imately nine out of ten photons are lost for every
50km of fibre they travel. In conventional com-
munications this problem is easily solved: optical
signals can be amplified at regular distance inter-
vals using ‘repeaters’, allowing us, for example, to
send signals from Europe to the American conti-
nent through underwater optical fibres. However,
the process of amplifying an optical signal can
be thought of as making extra copies of the pho-
tons to counteract the transmission losses. We
saw that quantum information cannot be copied,
which makes it challenging to develop repeaters
for quantum information. Although it is an active
area of research, currently QKD cannot rely on
quantum repeaters to send quantum information
over long distances. This means that the range
of QKD is limited and that there is a trade-off
between distance and the communication rate:
the longer the distance between Alice and Bob,
the fewer photons sent by Alice will reach Bob,
slowing the communication rate.
Much of the research in QKD has been devoted
to increasing the distance and communication
1It should be pointed out that practical implementations of PQC can also introduce security vulnerabilities
in the communication system.
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rate. Over the past two decades, there has been
great progress on this front: record distances for
QKD have increased roughly tenfold from around
50km to current state-of-the-art demonstrations
reaching distances over 500km [12]. These im-
provements are due to advances in the QKD hard-
ware as well as to the development of newer and
more efficient theoretical protocols. For longer
distances QKD needs to rely on repeaters. We
saw that quantum repeaters are not yet available,
but by linking several QKD systems one after
the other we can achieve a similar result. The
drawback is that at every link, or node, the secret
key is revealed. Therefore, we need to ensure that
no eavesdropping can occur at these nodes. Un-
til quantum repeaters become available, trusted
nodes will be the main solution for long distance
QKD.
Communication rate is another parameter where
QKD falls short compared to classical communi-
cations. Current classical optical communications
deliver speeds on the order of 100Gbit/s, whereas
QKD communications achieve rates in the range
of Mbit/s (100,000 times less). QKD is only used
to distribute the secret keys used for encryption
and not the private communications themselves,
so the communication rate requirements for QKD
are lower. However, increasing the communica-
tion rate of QKD is ‘arguably the most pressing
task in order to widen the applicable areas of
QKD technology’ [13].
QKD secured communications require specialised
hardware and will undoubtedly cost more to de-
velop than the PQC alternative. As QKD moves
out of the lab and towards commercialisation and
real-world use, cost-effectiveness is becoming an
increasing focus of QKD research efforts. Two
results are particularly promising: first, it has
been demonstrated that QKD can be performed
on the same optical fibres and at the same time as
high-traffic classical communications [14]. QKD
signals are so faint that there is no negative con-
sequence for other users of these fibres. In this
way QKD can make use of existing optical fibre
networks, removing much of the need for expen-
sive new optical fibre connections. Second, QKD
components are being integrated onto semicon-
ductor chips similar to the ones used in computers
and mobile phones. By leveraging advances in
semiconductor device manufacturing, QKD chips
can be mass-produced at low cost and with ex-
tremely small footprints. Chip-based QKD will
lower costs and allow for easier integration with
conventional computers and communication sys-
tems.
A testament to how far QKD has come are the
many field-deployments of QKD networks around
the world. Most impressive is the 2000km long
QKD link (using trusted nodes) between Shang-
hai and Beijing in China [15]. This project in-
cluded the first demonstration of QKD performed
via a satellite, connecting cities in China and
Austria. Other countries including the UK [16],
Switzerland [17], Austria [18] and Japan [19] have
also established prototype QKD networks. Most
recently the ‘OpenQKD’ project, a collaboration
between 38 partner universities and companies,
was launched in September 2019. With EU fund-
ing, the collaboration aims to ‘raise awareness
of the maturity of QKD’ as a technology and
‘lay the foundation for a pan-European quantum
network’ [20].
The challenges point nonetheless to the fact that
QKD will at first find applications in sectors deal-
ing with especially sensitive information, which
needs to be kept secret for many years. Less sen-
sitive communications can benefit from the high
speeds and low cost of PQC that we have come to
expect from our current communication methods.
QKD and PQC can be seen as complimentary
solutions for building quantum-safe communica-
tion systems, together covering the whole range
from low cost and high speed, to long-term high-
security applications. Indeed the NCSC [9], the
Blackett review [10], industry, and academia [2]
agree that QKD and PQC should continue to be
researched in parallel.
Outlook and Policy Recommen-
dations
ETSI cites a ‘perception of non-urgency’ as a bar-
rier to the adoption of quantum-safe communica-
tions [1]. This perception means that currently
there are no strong financial incentives for de-
veloping quantum-safe communications, in stark
contrast to quantum computing. For this rea-
son, investments into quantum technologies, the
so-called ‘quantum gold rush’, have been mostly
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directed to the latter [21]. Large technology com-
panies like Google, Microsoft and IBM are invest-
ing in their own research efforts. Companies, not
countries, are leading the race in quantum com-
puting. In this context, government support for
the development of quantum-safe communications
is crucial. I argue that PQC is well supported,
while QKD could benefit from increased support
and investment.
There are already many proposed PQC protocols,
mostly coming from academia. What is needed
now is to test and validate these protocols. This
work has been taken up by standards bodies.
As mentioned earlier NIST is planning to con-
clude its effort in this direction in 2022. In 2015
ETSI established the Quantum Safe Cryptogra-
phy Working Group to assess and recommend
PQC protocols. They recently held their sev-
enth ‘Quantum Safe Cryptography Workshop’,
bringing together academic and industry part-
ners. Additionally, companies like Google [22],
Microsoft [23] and Amazon [24] are already work-
ing towards integrating PQC protocols into their
services. This all contributes to a positive outlook
for PQC.
The perception of non-urgency, the practical chal-
lenges inherent to QKD, and a lack of awareness
of its unique advantages make commercialising
QKD challenging. Government support for this
technology is crucial, not least since government
and military applications are cited among the first
use cases for QKD. I propose the following policy
recommendations to support the development of
QKD, with a UK focus:
• Raise awareness of the threat
of quantum computing to private
communications and the available
solutions. This is especially important
for industries and sectors with long-term
security needs, which are particularly
vulnerable to retrospective decryption,
like government, military, and healthcare.
The NCSC provides practical cyber secu-
rity guidance through its Cyber Assess-
ment Framework. This framework should
be updated to account for the threat of
quantum computers, especially to com-
munications with long secrecy lifespans.
Awareness of the available solutions is
equally important. A survey of Infor-
mation Technology and Security profes-
sionals by the Cloud Security Alliance
found that ‘most respondents do not be-
lieve there is an existing solution to the
quantum computing threat’ [25].
• Clarify the unique advantages of-
fered by QKD as compared to PQC.
QKD is particularly suited to securing
communications with long security lifes-
pans and it is complementary to PQC.
In response to the recent NCSC white
paper, a commentary by the QKD in-
dustry and academic community states
that ‘wherever possible QKD should be
used in tandem with [PQC]’ and that
‘an approach suggesting a need to choose
between QKD and [PQC] is based on a
false dichotomy’ [2].
• Involve the NCSC in key pro-
grammes for the development and
standardisation of QKD. The QKD
community commentary explicitly wel-
comes direct involvement from the NCSC
in the development of new standards for
QKD [2]. The ETSI QKD Industry Spec-
ification Group [26] works to ensure the
future interoperability of diverse QKD
systems and that these systems are im-
plemented in a safe manner. Involvement
by the NCSC would ensure these stan-
dards meet the requirements of the Cyber
Assessment Framework.
• Engage in early trials of QKD for
government and military applica-
tions. Government and military have
long-term security needs that QKD is
well suited to address. Direct involve-
ment in early trials will support the de-
velopment of QKD and ensure QKD sys-
tems meet the needs of this specialist
sector.
• Continue funding research address-
ing the practical challenges of
QKD. This funding can be seen as an
investment, eventually paid off by the
reduction in cost and by the increase
in performance of real-world QKD sys-
tems. Progress in QKD research shows
no signs of stopping, with novel theo-
retical protocols designed on a regular
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basis and proof-of-principle experiments
moving to real-world demonstrations [27].
With continued investments we can ex-
pect the great progress of the past two
decades to continue.
• Invest in a backbone QKD network.
QKD is limited in range, therefore estab-
lishing long distance connections between
cities, and eventually countries, will re-
quire a large financial effort. An estab-
lished backbone QKD network will make
it easier for companies and individuals
to connect, widening the market and de-
mand for QKD. A backbone QKD net-
work will serve as the foundation for a fu-
ture quantum internet, with applications
that go beyond just secure communica-
tions, increasing its value.
Conclusion
There is an urgent need to transition the world’s
communication systems to quantum-safe meth-
ods. This review made the case for quantum key
distribution as a solution. QKD is:
• future-proof: communications secured by
QKD cannot be retroactively hacked;
• based on provably secure theoretical pro-
tocols;
• a building block towards a future quan-
tum internet.
The past 20 years of research and development
in the field of QKD have helped to address the
practical challenges of implementing QKD sys-
tems in the real-world. Proof of this are the many
demonstrations of quantum networks around the
world. Together, PQC and QKD can be used to
secure our communications even in the presence
of quantum computers. Government support for
QKD in particular is crucial while the technology
moves from research and development to commer-
cialisation. Sectors with long-term security needs,
including government and military, stand to ben-
efit from the unique advantages of QKD. The
policy recommendations provided will support
the development of this technology and ensure
that the long-term security needs of government,
military and other sectors are met.
c© 2020 The Author(s). Published by the Cambridge
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terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
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